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Abstract Vertical equity in property tax systems refers to the assessment
of all properties in a taxing jurisdiction at the same proportion
of their market values. This study considers alternative methods
for measuring vertical inequity in multi-family property markets
using sample data. The results indicate that vertical inequities do
exist in this sample, with lower valued properties being assessed
at a higher proportion of market value than higher valued
properties. This study suggests that owners of properties in lower
value ranges in this market should carefully monitor the
assessment process to minimize their property tax expense.
Introduction
Property taxes are a signiﬁcant expense item in most multi-family property
markets around the United States. Nationwide survey data from the Institute for
Real Estate Management (IREM) indicate that real estate taxes range from 5% to
10% of gross rents for various types of apartments. Given the magnitude of this
expense item, prudent management of property tax exposure can be an effective
strategy toward the goal of proﬁt maximization for real estate portfolio managers
and investors.
The property tax system in most taxing jurisdictions is an ad valorem tax, meaning
that the tax due on a particular property is determined by the value of the property
and the tax levy rate. The value of the property typically is estimated by an
assessment ofﬁcial based on market data and the tax levy rate is set by the taxing
authority (city or county commissioners, school boards, etc.) based on the taxing
authority’s budget. The ad valorem system suggests that an owner who wishes to
manage property tax exposure can do so by impacting either the political
budgeting process that affects tax levy rates or the assessment process used to
estimate value.
A property owner could endeavor to manage property tax expenses through
involvement in local politics with activities such as supporting candidates/parties
for elected ofﬁce who share the owner’s ﬁscal leanings, lobbying existing elected
ofﬁcials for decisions that coincide with the owner’s preferences, or, at the172  Allen
extreme, personally pursuing elected positions that carry budget authority. More
directly, however, property owners may attempt to affect property tax exposure
by monitoring the assessment process used in the ad valorem system and
challenging the assessment amount when an error is suspected.
Monitoring the accuracy of the assessment process is certainly not a new concept.
In the words of Denne (1977), for as long as there have been taxes there has been
concern that they be administered equitably, and the equity of the ad valorem
property tax has long been a controversial subject. An obvious criticism of the
property tax focuses on perceived or real inequities stemming from the failure of
assessing ofﬁcials to assess all properties in a taxing jurisdiction fairly according
to their market value. Giving assessing ofﬁcials the beneﬁt of the doubt regarding
any intentional manipulation of the assessment process, this failure may be due
in part to the inherent difﬁculties of accurately estimating property value. To the
extent that such difﬁculties vary across property value ranges, properties in
different value ranges may face different probabilities of being inequitably
assessed.
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how to measure or detect systematic
assessment inequities that may exist across value ranges in multi-family property
markets. If the assessment process in a local market is biased in favor of higher
or lower valued properties, property owners may be able to reduce their tax
liability by challenging their assessments through established procedures and thus
increase property proﬁtability.
The ﬁrst section of this paper discusses various methods that have been proposed
to measure inequity in property tax systems. While these methods were originally
developed to consider inequity in single-family houses and condominium units,
they can be readily adapted to measure inequity in multi-family properties. The
second section demonstrates the application of the measurement methods to
sample data consisting of recently sold, small-scale, multi-family properties in the
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, metropolitan area. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
 Methods for Measuring Inequity in the Property Tax
Structure
The ad valorem property tax system continues to serve as an essential element of
the revenue source for local governments, despite the gradual decline in its
importance over the preceding ninety-ﬁve years (see Smith, 2000). When it comes
to deﬁning equity, or fairness, in the context of ad valorem property taxes, the
concept is commonly divided along two dimensions: horizontal equity and vertical
equity.
Horizontal equity refers to discrimination in the tax base between properties with
similar market value (see Doering, 1977). In empirical studies of horizontal equity,
some degree of variation in the assessment of properties with similar market valuesMeasuring Vertical Property Tax Inequity  173
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is always assumed to be present and is acceptable within limits. Some variation
is acceptable because observed price is often relied on as a measure of
unobservable ‘‘true’’ value, but transaction prices may reﬂect factors other than
property value. For example, transaction prices may reﬂect reduced marketing
times, the value of personal property items included in the transaction, unusual
ﬁnancing, atypical buyer and seller motivations, and information asymmetry (see
Haurin, 1988; Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton, 1990; and Smith,
2000). Reinmuth (1977) claims that horizontal inequities are uncontrollable,
random deviations of transaction prices from market values and can, therefore, be
ignored.
The second dimension of equity, vertical equity, refers to the degree of variation
of assessed values from market values across various property value ranges. For
a property tax system to be vertically equitable, all properties within a taxing
jurisdiction must be assessed in equal proportion to their market value. A vertically
inequitable tax system can be further classiﬁed as ‘‘regressive’’ if higher valued
properties are taxed more favorably than lower valued properties and
‘‘progressive’’ if higher valued properties are taxed less favorably than lower
valued properties. Following the arguments of Reinmuth (1977), the focus of this
study is on vertical equity.
The property tax equity research literature contains numerous methods for
detecting vertical inequity, including those proposed by Paglin and Fogarty (1972),
Cheng (1974), the International Association of Assessing Ofﬁcers (IAAO) (1978),
Kochin and Parks (1982), Bell (1984), Clapp (1990) and Sunderman, Birch,
Cannaday and Hamilton (1990). In their 1991 study of vertical equity regarding
single-family properties in Miami, Florida, Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995)
review these methods in detail, but draw no ﬁrm conclusion about which method
is the deﬁnitive choice for use in empirical studies such as this one (see Benson
and Schwartz, 1997 and 2000, for more discussion of this issue). The appropriate
choice depends on the source of error in the assessment process and the nature
of the relationship between assessed values and sales prices across price ranges,
as discussed below.
The model developed by Paglin and Fogarty (1972) is widely regarded as the
seminal work on the topic of vertical inequity. They propose that inequity can be
detected when the intercept term in Equation (1) is signiﬁcantly different from
zero.
AV  a  aS P . (1) 01
In this equation, AV and SP represent assessed value and sales price for each
property, respectively. AV is established by the assessing authority and SP is
employed as a proxy for the unobservable market value of each property. If vertical
equity is present, an estimated regression line for the above equation would174  Allen
originate from the origin and would have a slope coefﬁcient approximately equal
to the AV/SP ratio for the sample. A signiﬁcantly negative intercept term indicates
a progressive tax structure, with lower value properties being taxed at a lower
percentage of market value. Similarly, a signiﬁcantly positive intercept term
indicates a regressive tax structure.
The Cheng (1974) model is a log-linear model deﬁned as shown in Equation (2).
The coefﬁcient of interest in this model is a1. If this slope coefﬁcient is equal to
one, there is no vertical inequity. A slope coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcantly greater
(less) than one indicates a progressive (regressive) tax structure.
ln AV  a  a ln SP. (2) 01
The IAAO (1978) model shown in Equation (3) relies on the assessment ratio
(assessed value divided by sales price  AV/SP) as the dependent variable. In this
model, the coefﬁcient on SP indicates the presence (and type) of detectable vertical
inequity. If the coefﬁcient is zero, there is no vertical inequity. If the coefﬁcient
is signiﬁcantly greater (less) than zero, the tax structure is progressive (regressive).
AV/SP  a  aS P . (3) 01
The Bell (1984) model shown in Equation (4) includes a quadratic term to address
potential non-linearity in the data. If the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term is
insigniﬁcantly different from zero, the model reduces to the Paglin and Fogarty
(1972) model discussed above, and the assessment process is linear progressive
if the intercept term is negative and linear regressive if the intercept term is
positive. If, on the other hand, the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term is signiﬁcant
and negative (positive), the tax system displays accelerating regressivity
(progressivity). If neither the intercept nor the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term is
signiﬁcant, there is no indication of inequity in the tax system of either kind.
Signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on SP2 would support the use of this functional
form (as opposed to a linear model) in measuring vertical inequity.
2 AV  a  aS P aS P. (4) 01 2
The Clapp (1990) model shown in Equation (5) introduces an instrumental
variables method that incorporates information from both assessed value and sales
price into the dependent variable using two-stage least squares regression. An
instrumental variable, Z, is formed by ranking the data by sales price and by
assessed value. Z takes the value 1 if the property has both a sales price rank andMeasuring Vertical Property Tax Inequity  175
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an assessed value rank in the highest one-third of the observations, 1i ft h e
property has both a sales price rank and an assessed value rank in the lowest one-
third of the observations, and 0 otherwise. This instrumental variable is ﬁrst
regressed on the natural log of AV, and the predicted values from this ﬁrst stage
regression are then regressed on the natural log of SP. The two-stage model takes
the following form:
ln AV  a  aZ(stage one) 01
ln SP  B  B ln AV (stage two). (5) 01
A coefﬁcient estimate for B1 greater than one indicates that lower valued properties
are assessed at a higher proportion of value than are higher-valued properties
(regressive), a value less than one indicates the opposite situation (progressive),
and a value equal to one indicates an equitable situation.
The potential presence of non-linearity in assessment data and the possibility that
the functional relationship between sales price and assessed value may vary for
some portions of some data sets led Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton
(1990) to propose the use of spline regression modeling when analyzing
assessment equity. Spline regression techniques are useful when different regions
of a data set are explained by different functions, with unique intercept terms and
slope coefﬁcients for each region. The Sunderman et al. model is preferred when
the relationship between assessed values and sales prices exhibit non-linearity that
cannot be captured in a simple quadratic model. For data that display S-shaped
relationships between assessed value and sales prices, Sunderman et al. suggest
the use of the piecewise spline regression model as shown in Equation (6):
AV  a  aS P  aL O W  aH I G H 00 10 01 02
 aL O W S P  a HIGHSP (6) 11 12
where:
LOW  Dummy variable equal to one if the property’s sales price is lower
than the ﬁrst knot, otherwise zero;
HIGH  Dummy variable equal to one if the property’s sales price is higher
than the ﬁrst knot, otherwise zero;
LOWSP  Sales price of the property if the sales price is lower than the ﬁrst
knot, otherwise zero; and
HIGHSP  Sales price of the property if the sales price is higher than the second
knot, otherwise zero; and a00 through a12 are parameters to be
estimated.176  Allen
The piecewise spline model allows multiple relationships to exist among low-,
average- and high-valued properties. The knots are subjectively selected to
distinguish between data value range categories based on observed inﬂection
points in the data. Inequity is indicated for different value ranges of properties in
a data set by signiﬁcance of the estimated intercept parameters a00, a01 and a02.
As argued by Smith (2000), the choice of which model to employ to test for
vertical inequity is ﬁrst contingent on the researcher’s perception or a priori
information on the source of error in the analysis. If the source of error is believed
to be in the use of sales price as a proxy for market value, then Clapp’s (1990)
model is more appropriate. Otherwise, the ﬁnal decision about which model is
most appropriate depends, as discussed by Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and
Hamilton (1990), on whether the relationship between observed assessed values
and sales prices is linear or nonlinear.
 Empirical Analysis of Vertical Inequity in the Property
Tax Structure
To apply the measures of vertical inequity discussed above, a sample of properties
was drawn from the population of small-scale, multi-family properties in the Fort
Lauderdale (Broward County), Florida, metropolitan area. (This population of
properties was selected for analysis based on data availability.) Florida law
requires the (elected) county property appraiser to certify the accuracy of the tax
roll and the assessed value of all taxable properties in the county as of January 1
of each year. A search of the 2001 Broward County records identiﬁed 16,785 tax
parcels containing two to ten residential units. Most of these properties appear to
be owned by non-institutional, ‘‘Mom & Pop’’ investors. In 2001, slightly more
than 8% (1,369) of these properties were transferred via warranty deed, with sales
price being recording in public records. To the extent that the properties sold
during the study period are representative of the population of such properties,
this sample is unbiased.
Screening the ‘‘sold’’ properties to eliminate those with missing data and those
for which the sales price appears to be the result of other than arm’s-length
negotiations yields a ﬁnal sample of 688 observations. In particular, properties
were eliminated from the sample if the buyer and seller had the same family name,
if either the buyer or the seller was a ﬁnancial institution or government agency,
if the transaction involved multiple tax parcels, or if the implied assessed value
to sales price ratio for the property was less than 70% or greater than 1.25%.1
The observations in the ﬁnal sample are geographically distributed throughout the
Fort Lauderdale metropolitan area. Descriptive statistics for sales price, assessed
value, assessed value/sales price ratio, year built and number of residential units
for the properties included in the ﬁnal sample (by quartiles) are provided in
Exhibit 1.
Applying the various models for detecting vertical inequity to the sample data





























































Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics for Multifamily Property Assessment Data Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All Observations (N  688)
Sales Price (SP) $150,755.02 $72,955.38 $20,000 $465,000
Assessed Value (AV ) $126,537.22 $61,106.67 $18,410 $502,660
AV /SP Ratio 0.85 0.13 0.70 1.24
Year Built 1968.67 10.03 1950 1999
Number of Residential Units 2.89 1.47 2 10
Panel B: First Quartile (N  172)
Sales Price (SP) $77,772.09 $14,171.32 $20,000 $98,000
Assessed Value (AV ) $71,045.17 $16,387.60 $18,410 $115,670
AV /SP Ratio 0.92 0.15 0.70 1.24
Year Built 1964.99 9.74 1950 1993
Number of Residential Units 2.23 0.63 2 6
Panel C: Second Quartile (N  184)
Sales Price (SP) $119,795.11 $10,598.22 $99,900 $135,000
Assessed Value (AV ) $100,120.92 $14,844.88 $70,370 $157,870
AV /SP Ratio 0.84 0.11 0.70 1.23
Year Built 1970.49 9.49 1950 1997









Exhibit 1  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Multifamily Property Assessment Data Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel D: Third Quartile (N  172)
Sales Price (SP) $157,213.04 $13,155.99 $136,300 $185,000
Assessed Value (AV ) $130,364.65 $19,655.56 $100,740 $198,620
AV /SP Ratio 0.83 0.11 0.70 1.24
Year Built 1970.23 9.38 1950 1999
Number of Residential Units 2.91 1.18 2 8
Panel E: Fourth Quartile (N  160)
Sales Price (SP) $257,873.21 $63,268.79 $85,000 $465,000
Assessed Value (AV ) $212,455.44 $59,941.29 $131,530 $502,660
AV /SP Ratio 0.82 0.12 0.70 1.21
Year Built 1968.86 10.63 1950 1999
Number of Residential Units 4.25 2.03 2 10





























































Exhibit 2  Results from Applying Vertical Inequity Measures to Multifamily Property Sample Data
Paglin and Fogarty




























SP2   1.23e-07
(1.283)

lnAV    1.047*
(49.10)

LOW     18,098.11
(1.201)
HIGH     7,347.39
(0.509)
LOWSP      0.133
(1.065)
HIGHSP      0.056
(0.550)
F-Statistic 5,693.68* 6,266.58* 32.22* 2,850.34* 2,410.70* 1,140.74*









Exhibit 2  (continued)
Results from Applying Vertical Inequity Measures to Multifamily Property Sample Data
Paglin and Fogarty
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Notes: t-Statistics are in parentheses. N  688.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level
Paglin and Fogarty Model: AV  a0  a1SP.
Cheng Model: AV  a0  a1 ln SP.
IAAO Model: AV /SP  a0  a1SP.
Bell Model: AV  a0  a1SP  a2SP2.
Clapp Model (second stage results only): ln SP  B0  B1 ln AV.
Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton: AV  a00  a10SP  a01LOW  a02HIGH  a11LOWSP  a12HIGHSP.Measuring Vertical Property Tax Inequity  181
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Exhibit 3  Relationship between AV and SP in Multifamily Property Sample
Regression Line
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Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton (1990) model, the results indicate that lower value
properties in this sample are assessed at a higher proportion of market value (as
proxied by sales price) than are higher value properties (signiﬁcance level of 1%).
The intercept term in the Paglin and Fogarty (1972) model is positive and
signiﬁcantly different from zero. The R2 for this model is .89. The slope coefﬁcient
in the Cheng (1974) model is signiﬁcantly less than one, based on an F-Statistic
of 50.32, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The Cheng model has an R2 of .90.
Though small in magnitude, the slope coefﬁcient in the IAAO (1978) model is
negative and signiﬁcant. The R2 for the IAAO model is only .04, which is
consistent with the R2 reported in other studies using the IAAO model. In the Bell
(1984) model, the signiﬁcant and positive intercept term indicates a regressive tax
system, but the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The R2 for the Bell model is .89. The slope coefﬁcient of 1.047 from the second
stage of the Clapp (1990) model is signiﬁcantly greater than 1 at the 5% level182  Allen
based on an F-Statistic of 4.87, but the difference is not signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The R2 for the Clapp model is .78.
The intercept term and the coefﬁcients for LOW and HIGH in the Sunderman,
Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton (1990) model are not signiﬁcantly different from
zero, indicating no vertical inequity in the tax structure for this sample. However,
a plot of the data shown in Exhibit 3 (with a ﬁtted linear trend line and a 45
degree line that indicates ‘‘perfect equity’’ with all properties assessed at 100%
of their market values) does not support an S-shaped relationship between assessed
value and sales price, suggesting that the spline model is not the appropriate
functional form for testing vertical inequity in this sample. Even so, the R2 for
the Sunderman et al. model is approximately .89. (The results shown are based
on knots determined by the break points identifying the lowest and highest one-
thirds of the sample based on sales price. Varying the knots by 10% in either
direction does not affect the insigniﬁcance of the coefﬁcients of interest.)
 Conclusion
Previous studies that have examined vertical inequity in ad valorem property tax
systems have largely focused on single-family residential properties. This study
applies several of the analysis methods proposed in those studies to examine
vertical inequity in the property tax system for a sample of multi-family properties.
The choice of which of the various models to use to measure vertical inequity in
this and other multi-family property markets depends largely on the nature of the
relationship between assessed value and sales price and on whether sales price is
a reasonable estimate of market value. Because the market for small-scale (two-
to ten-unit) multi-family properties in the Fort Lauderdale metropolitan area
appears to have been adequately active during the sample period, sales price is a
reasonable proxy for market value. Furthermore, visual inspection of a plot of the
data used in this study suggests that the relationship between assessed value and
sales price is approximately linear. Together, these characteristics suggest that the
Paglin and Fogarty (1972) model and the Cheng (1974) model are most
appropriate for measuring vertical inequity in this sample. Both of these models
(along with the IAAO, 1978; Bell, 1984; and Clapp, 1990) models) indicate the
presence of vertical inequity.
Speciﬁcally, the evidence indicates that lower value properties are assessed at a
higher proportion of their market value than are higher value properties. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that the assessment process is more accurate
for lower value properties in this market. Owners of higher value properties in
this market appear to be receiving favorable tax treatment in comparison to owners
of lower value properties.
To demonstrate the economic signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding, consider that the average
property in the lowest price quartile of this sample has an indicated market value
of $77,772 and is assessed at 92% of this amount and that the average propertyMeasuring Vertical Property Tax Inequity  183
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in the highest price quartile has an indicated market value of $257,873 and is
assessed at 82% of this amount. Applying a tax rate of 30 mills to assessed value
(or 3%, which is typical for this market), the effective tax rate in terms of market
value for the average property in the lowest price quartile is 2.76% ((77772 
.92  .03)/77772  .0276) while the effective tax rate in terms of market value
for the average property in the highest price quartile is 2.46% ((257873  .82 
.03)/257873  0.0246). If the average property in the lowest price quartile were
assessed at 82% of market value instead of 92%, the annual tax bill (at 30 mills)
for that property would be $1,913.19 instead of $2,146.51, an annual property tax
savings of $227.32, or 10.6%. Capitalizing this savings (which can be interpreted
as an increase in net operating income) at an assumed overall rate of 10% suggests
that property value in the lowest price quartile could be increased by an average
of $2,273.20, or 2.92% (2273.20/77772  0.0292).
While these results can not be generalized to all multi-family property markets,
this study demonstrates how vertical property tax inequity can be measured in
other multi-family property markets and should prove valuable for multi-family
property owners in their efforts to maximize proﬁtability.
 Endnote
1 The ﬁrst three screening criteria (transactions involving the same family name,
government agencies or ﬁnancial institutions) serve to eliminate transactions with
different ‘‘conditions of sale’’ that could result in observed prices that are biased from
market value. The fourth screening criterion eliminates transactions involving more than
one property. This screen is necessary because recorded prices reﬂect the total transaction
price without distinguishing the price of individual parcels when there are multiple
parcels included in the transaction. The ﬁnal screening criteria serves to eliminate
potential outliers in the data for which assessed value and transaction price differ widely
such that A V/SP  0.70 or A V/SP  1.25. Outliers could be the result of personal
property being included in the transaction, unusual ﬁnancing arrangements, a property
being signiﬁcantly renovated or damaged between the date of the assessment and the
transaction date, changes in the property’s highest and best use between these dates, or
numerous other issues. Taken together, the net effect of these ﬁve screening criteria is to
narrow the range of A V/SP ratios included in the sample, which could bias the analysis
in favor of the null hypothesis (no vertical inequity in this sample).
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